


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USSR - Communist China: There has been no indication of how far the Sino-Soviet border talks progressed during the first week, but both sides have kept a damper on polemics.

The Soviets have been attempting to convey an optimistic attitude in discussions with Western officials, although they generally concede that the talks will be long and arduous. The chairman of the Supreme Soviet Council of Nationalities told US officials that the talks were "not easy." He added that Moscow was anxious to iron out rail transit and trade problems in addition to the border issue. Kosygin had told French Foreign Minister Schumann earlier this month of Moscow's desire to use the talks as a step toward some normalization of state and economic relations, a position that has also been implied in Soviet public statements.

Brezhnev maintained Moscow's generally conciliatory public stance in a speech to the visiting Czechoslovak delegation yesterday. He claimed that the USSR would do all it could to normalize relations with China and stressed that the Soviet side is showing goodwill. In referring to the Kosygin-Chou meeting he even called Chou "Comrade," a gesture not known to have been made since 1966.

The Soviets have still not replied to the strong Chinese statement of 8 October on the border issue. Nevertheless, a Soviet Foreign Ministry official is reported to have told a foreign diplomat recently that Moscow fully intends to answer the "false and slanderous statements" in the Chinese document. He implied, however, that the Kremlin has not yet decided on the format.

Peking for its part still feels free to attack the Soviets on specific issues, such as negotiations with the US on the seabeds treaty, and to warn its population against the Soviet military threat. However, the Chinese continue to abstain from harsher and more general polemics.

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Lebanon: Efforts to ease tension between the government and the fedayeen continue, but the outcome remains uncertain.

The government is under tremendous pressure from the Arab world to accommodate the fedayeen. [REDACTED]

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25X1 [REDACTED] The fedayeen, emboldened by Egyptian President Nasir's intervention, have already stated their demands: complete freedom of action in Lebanon, removal of restrictions at Palestinian refugee camps, and punishment for those responsible for initiating the clashes that started the present turmoil.

25X1 Meanwhile, Lebanon's traditional Muslim politicians are beginning to lose control over their followers, who are now looking to the fedayeen for inspiration and guidance. [REDACTED]

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25X1 [REDACTED] The army decided yesterday to call up its reserves because it does not have sufficient regular manpower to deal with both the fedayeen and demonstrations such as those the leftists are planning.

Except in Tripoli, the government yesterday lifted or relaxed the 24-hour curfew it had imposed upon all major urban centers. The fedayeen continue to control the old city in Tripoli, but fighting there has tapered off. Occupants of the country's various refugee camps are reported to be digging in--constructing trenches, laying mines, and setting up bazooka and gun emplacements--to prevent the army from taking control of the camps. Late yesterday, fedayeen apparently were responsible for a rocket attack on an oil storage facility south of Beirut.

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
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# CONGO/ANGOLA: Joint Repatriation of Katangan Refugees Proceeds



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Congo (Kinshasa) - Angola: Security authorities apparently are proceeding with a joint program for repatriating former Katangan gendarmes who took refuge in Angola after their abortive mutiny in 1967.

On 25 October, a high-level Portuguese official informed the US consul general in Luanda that some 200 former gendarmes had already been returned to Katanga Province for resettlement in their home villages. The Portuguese official claimed that additional repatriations were in process and that the Congo Government had guaranteed not to take reprisals against the returnees.

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Formal relations between Kinshasa and Lisbon were severed in 1966.

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The Portuguese have maintained at least some of the Katangans in military units, and Congolese authorities take seriously continuing rumors that European mercenaries plan to lead the former gendarmes in an invasion of Katanga. The actual completion of the repatriation project would be the most important result of the cautious overtures being made by both sides toward restoration of normal relations.

(Map)

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Kenya: The arrest of opposition leaders will further heighten tribal tensions.

The Kikuyu-dominated government of President Jomo Kenyatta did not ban the opposition party, the Kenya People's Union. It did arrest all of its leaders, however, including radical nationalist Oginga Odinga and the party's seven other members of parliament. The government claims that these men, most of whom are Luos, were responsible for the disturbances during President Kenyatta's goodwill tour of predominantly Luo areas. Perhaps as many as a dozen people were killed last Saturday when security troops opened fire on Luo tribesmen who were throwing rocks at the President.

The government's overreaction to the incidents over the weekend is certain to widen the rift between Kenya's two largest tribes and could provoke further violence. The Luo were already bitter because they suspect the ruling Kikuyu clique of instigating the assassination last July of the Luos' fellow tribesman, Tom Mboya. They also regard the resurgence over the past several months of oath taking ceremonies, at which they believe Kikuyu leaders swear their tribesmen to loyalty, as further proof of the ruling tribe's intention to maintain power at all costs.

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El Salvador - Honduras: The chance of a rapprochement between the two countries is rapidly fading.

Hopes for a resolution of the dispute have rested on the OAS-sponsored negotiations that have been underway in Washington since early October. It appears increasingly unlikely, however, that an agreement can be reached. Top Honduran officials have indicated that their government will not obey a pending OAS resolution calling for opening the border to Salvadoran transit trade. They object to the companion resolution calling for settlement of the border dispute because it does not commit El Salvador to a firm timetable for negotiations.

Honduran resolve to stick to this position undoubtedly will be stiffened by the aroused state of public opinion. Student, labor, and other groups, which held anti-OAS, anti-US demonstrations on Sunday, have vowed to prevent opening of the border unless there is a clear quid pro quo. In addition, the military, which up to now has firmly supported all presidential initiatives, has reportedly decided not to support the president if he opens the border before the Salvadorans have simultaneously agreed to talks on frontier demarcation.

Although there has been strong domestic pressure from Salvadoran political and business groups for unilateral government action to resolve the situation, Salvadoran President Sanchez has preferred to rely on the OAS to bring an end to Honduran trade obstruction. If progress is not made soon, however, Sanchez may have to take drastic economic steps to end Honduran economic strangulation. One step might be to close the border to all Central American Common Market traffic in an effort to force the other member states to put pressure on Honduras.

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
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Surinam: Another coalition government will have to be formed because no single party won a clear majority in the elections on 24 October.

The United Hindu Party Group won 18 of the 39 seats, but fell two shy of an absolute majority. Jagernath Lachmon, the leader of the party, is expected to invite the Progressive National Party (PNP), which increased its seats from four to seven, to join in the formation of a new government.

Former minister-president Pengel's Surinam National Party, which lost five of its 18 seats, is expected to lead the opposition. Edward Bruma, the extreme leftist leader of the Nationalistic Republic Party, won representation in the Staten for the first time. Bruma has become very popular because he has been an effective and dedicated labor leader. Bruma is not expected to cooperate with Pengel in the opposition because party objectives differ and Bruma sees no advantage to such an arrangement. Both parties espouse independence immediately.

The incoming administration will have to make important decisions regarding the pace of independence, how to settle the border dispute with Guyana, and what direction the nation will take in solving other problems, such as unemployment and the development of resources.



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Warsaw Pact: Warsaw Pact consultations on preparations for a European Security Conference will begin on Thursday in Prague, according to an announcement from Budapest. The meeting apparently has been scheduled to take the play away from a similar assembly of NATO deputy foreign ministers on 5-6 November. Earlier reports from Eastern European sources suggest that the Warsaw Pact powers are planning to issue a new appeal on European security. [REDACTED]

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Portugal: The government's National Union Party won all the seats in Sunday's National Assembly election. At least one third of the deputies elected are new men hand picked by Prime Minister Caetano to support his policies. Caetano is likely now to concentrate his attention on modernizing the economy because military leaders and other supporters of former Premier Salazar have discouraged him from resuming consideration of increased autonomy for the African provinces, at least for the time being. [REDACTED]

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Venezuela-Guyana: The appointment of Leopoldo Taylhardat as Venezuelan consul in Manaus, Brazil, is likely to increase Guyanese concern over Venezuelan subversive activities. Taylhardat was expelled from Guyana in 1967 for subverting the native Amerindian population. He reportedly has been in Surinam in recent months establishing contacts with dissident Guyanese Amerindians. Although Venezuelan Foreign Minister Calvani personally assured Guyanese Foreign Minister Ramphal that Taylhardat would be assigned to some distant post, the proximity of Manaus to the disputed Essequibo region could provide Taylhardat with the opportunity for further subversive efforts against Guyana. [REDACTED]

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